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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Plaintiff/Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on July 29, 2004. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) and 4, Utah 
Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court misinterpret U.C.A. § 31 A-22-309(l)(a) to require that the 
jury be prohibited from awarding damages to plaintiff until it first made a special finding that 
plaintiffs automobile-accident-related medical expenses exceeded $3,000, when the no-fault 
statutory scheme does not create a burden of proof at trial, but instead requires that any 
dispute over the amount of a plaintiff s medical bills be raised by the defendant and resolved 
before a plaintiff is allowed to maintain a cause of action for general damages at trial? 
The court of appeals reviews a trial court's interpretation of a statute on a 
correctness standard, granting no deference to the trial court: 'The interpretation of a statute 
. . . presents a question of law, which this court reviews for correctness." Parks v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, ^ [ 4, 53 P.3d 473. Also, where, as here, a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or new trial is based on the interpretation of law, an appellate 
court reviews the trial court's ruling for correctness. Horrellv. Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co., 909 
P.2d 1279,1280 (Ct. App. 1996). The issue was preserved in the trial court as evidenced in 
R. 268 (2:6-7, 6:6-7), R. 214-15. 
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APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following State of Utah statutory provisions are relevant to the disposition 
of this appeal: 
31 A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection. 
(1) (a) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage 
under a policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a 
cause of action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged 
to have been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has 
sustained one or more of the following: 
(i) death; 
(ii) dismemberment; 
(iii) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective 
findings; 
(iv) permanent disfigurement; or 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and benefits. 
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include: 
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, 
X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, 
hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed the total minimum required 
coverage of $3,000 per person; 
(e) (i) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of 
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than 
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the 
issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or 
expenses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff was injured from a rear-end automobile collision and brought suit to 
recover his damages. The case was tried to a jury on February 4, 5, and 6, 2004. At the 
close of defendant's evidence, plaintiff moved for directed verdict, asserting that the only 
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valid issue for the jury was the amount of damages to award plaintiff. The court denied 
plaintiffs motion. At the close of trial on February 6, 2004, the court submitted a special 
verdict form to the jury which, contrary to the court's order of February 2, 2004, asked the 
jury to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether plaintiff had incurred 
accident-related medical bills in excess of $3,000 and, if not, prohibited the jury from 
awarding any damages to plaintiff. 
The jury found that defendant's negligence had caused injury to plaintiff, but 
found that plaintiffs medical bills did not exceed $3000 and, following the court's direction, 
awarded no damages to plaintiff. The court then entered judgment for defendant. 
On March 12,2004, plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
or in the alternative, a new trial on damages, arguing that it was legal error to submit a 
threshold question to the jury. The court denied plaintiff s motion and plaintiff filed a Notice 
of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff was injured on September 25, 1997, when the vehicle he was 
driving was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by defendant. R. 1, 6. 
2. Prior to filing suit, State Farm Insurance Company, which was 
plaintiffs no-fault insurer as well as defendant's liability insurer, evaluated and paid over 
$3,500 in medical bills as related to the collision. R. 214, 226-229. 
-3-
3. At no time before the start of trial did defendant move to contest the 
amount of plaintiff s medical bills or to dispute that plaintiff had satisfied the requirements 
of U.CA. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) to maintain a claim for general damages. 
4. On February 2, 2004, the court entered "Order on Defendant's 
Liability/' ordering as follows: 
The court shall enter a finding and the jury shall 
be instructed that Defendant was negligent and 
that Defendant's negligence proximately caused 
the collision. 
The issues presented to the jury for decision will 
be limited to proximate causation of Plaintiffs 
injuries and to the amount of Plaintiff s damages. 
R.83-84. 
5. The case was tried to a jury on February 4, 5, and 6. R. 162-166. 
6. On the first day of trial, the court indicated that despite defendant's 
failure to contest plaintiffs medical bills before trial, it would allow defendant to assert that 
plaintiff had not met a $3,000 medical expense threshold, and also that it would instruct the 
jury that it could not award damages to plaintiff unless it first determined by a preponderance 
of evidence that plaintiff had incurred more than $3,000 in medical expenses from the 
accident. R. 214. 
7. The court instructed plaintiff that he would not be allowed to introduce 
evidence at trial that defendant's own liability carrier, State Farm Insurance Company, had 
paid over $3,500 in plaintiff s medical bills from the accident, nor would plaintiff be allowed 
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to demonstrate to the jury that State Farm had performed an evaluation wherein it approved 
certain of plaintiff s medical bills as related to the accident and denied payment for other bills 
as not related to the accident. R. 214-215. The court stated the probative value of such 
evidence was outweighed by unfair prejudice to defendant. R. 215. 
8. During trial, defendant targeted certain of plaintiff s medical bills and 
adduced evidence through his experts that, in their opinion, certain treatments and billing 
amounts were not related to the automobile collision, and that plaintiffs accident-related 
medical bills did not exceed $3,000. R. 215. 
9. Plaintiff adduced evidence at trial that his accident-related medical bills 
did exceed $3,000; however, the court would not allow plaintiff to adduce evidence that 
defendant's liability carrier had acknowledged that plaintiff had incurred accident-related 
medical bills in excess of $3,000. R. 213, 224. 
10. At the close of defendant's evidence at trial, plaintiff moved for directed 
verdict, asserting that the only valid issue for the jury was the amount of damages awardable 
to plaintiff. R. 215. 
11. The court denied plaintiffs motion for directed verdict and submitted 
to the jury the issues of (1) causation, (2) whether plaintiff had incurred $3,000 in accident-
related medical bills, and, if so, (3) the amount of plaintiff s damages. R. 215, 167-169. 
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12. The jury found that defendant's negligence had caused injury to 
plaintiff, but did not find from a preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiffs related 
medical expenses exceeded $3,000. R. 167-168. 
13. Based on the jury's finding of less than $3,000 in accident-related 
medical bills, the jury was instructed to make no further findings and to award nothing to 
plaintiff. R. 168-169. 
14. The court entered judgment on behalf of defendant finding that 
defendant's negligence had caused injury to plaintiff, but that plaintiff was entitled to no 
damages because he had not incurred more than $3,000 in accident-related medical expenses. 
R. 201-203. 
15. Subsequent to trial, plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, or alternatively, a new trial on damages, asserting, inter alia, it was legal error to 
make plaintiff prove and to require the jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff had incurred in excess of $3,000 in accident-related medical expenses, before the 
jury would be allowed to award damages. R. 210-211. 
16. The court denied plaintiffs motion. R. 254-255. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The trial court incorrectly interpreted U.C.A.§ 31A-22-309(l)(a) to require 
submission of a special interrogatory to the jury which prohibited the jury from awarding 
damages to Plaintiff until the jury first found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
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plaintiff had incurred more than $3,000 in medical expenses related to his automobile-
accident (in other words that plaintiff had met "threshold"). By its interpretation, the trial 
court created a new burden of proof for plaintiff not authorized by the statute. 
Rules of statutory construction require the court of appeals to interpret a 
statutory provision according to its plain language and within the context of its statutory 
scheme. Following such rules, the intent of U.C.A.§ 31A-22-309(l)(a) was not to create a 
burden of proof at trial for plaintiff, but to provide a pre-adjudicative screening process to 
remove less-severe car accident cases from the court system. Through the overall no-fault 
statutory scheme and U.C.A.§ 31A-22-307(2)(e), the legislature established procedures to 
screen non-threshold cases from the court system. Plaintiff met threshold, as acknowledged 
by Defendant's own liability carrier through evaluation and payment of medical bills in 
excess of $3,500. Defendant failed to contest by motion, the plaintiffs right to pursue 
damages in court and plaintiff was therefore entitled to maintain his claims at trial without 
a contest over the amounts of specific medical bills. 
POINT II. 
During litigation, plaintiff prepared to prove and at trial did prove his case on 
the required elements of negligence and causation of injury. Just two days before trial, the 
court ordered that these would be the only issues presented to the jury for resolution. R. 83-
84. By informing Plaintiff on the first day of trial that the jury would be presented with a 
threshold question and that damages would be contingent on the jury's finding, the court 
unexpectedly and unfairly saddled Plaintiff with a new burden of proof, and transformed the 
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nature of the trial Defendant focused his trial attack at creating questions on certain 
treatments received by plaintiff and the amount of those bills. He was thus enabled to 
undermine the real issues in the case and preclude plaintiff from any recovery. 
The trial court compounded the effect of its legal error by precluding plaintiff 
from adducing evidence that defendant's own liability carrier had acknowledged, through 
evaluation and payment of plaintiff s bills, that plaintiff had met threshold. 
POINT III. 
The purpose of U.C.A.§ 31 A-22-309(l)(a) would be defeated, and enormous 
judicial and litigant resources would be wasted through adopting the trial court's 
interpretation of the statutory provision. Resolution of the threshold question need not and 
should not take place at the end of a full-fledged trial. A system is already in place to resolve 
the threshold question at the threshold of a legal case. 
As evidenced by the trial court's statements during hearing of plaintiff s motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, guidance is needed from the appellate courts on 





THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE NO-FAULT 
STATUTORY SCHEME DOES NOT CREATE A NEW 
BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL, BUT PROVIDES A 
PRE-ADJUDICATIVE SCREENING PROCESS. 
The court should reverse the trial court's Judgment and denial of plaintiff s 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, since the Judgment is based on the trial 
court's legal error. The trial court erroneously submitted a no-fault threshold question to the 
jury, prohibiting the jury from awarding any damages, unless it first found, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that plaintiffs accident-related medical bills exceeded $3,000. 
By enacting the no-fault automobile insurance scheme, including the $3,000 
medical expense threshold to maintain a claim for general damages, the Utah State 
Legislature did not create an additional burden of proof for plaintiffs suing for compensation 
from an automobile collision, nor did it intend to require a full-fledged civil trial to determine 
whether a given claim should have been resolved through the court system, or, whether it 
belonged, all along, in the no-fault system. The plain-language intention of the threshold 
statute was to screen less-severe cases from the court system, and, ostensibly, to lessen the 
burden on the trial courts and conserve judicial resources. Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 
562 (Utah App. 1997), Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 937 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Utah App. 
1997). See also, 12A Mark S. Rhodes, Couch on Insurance 2d § 45:667, at 271 (rev. ed. 
1981) (explaining "no-fault plans are designed to limit the number of common law tort suits 
-9-
arising out of automobile accidents. The mechanism for determining which claims are serious 
enough to be the subject of litigation is the threshold."), George v. Welch, 997 P.2d 1248, 
1251 (Colo. Ap. 1999) (u[T]he purpose of the threshold requirement [in no-fault scheme] is 
to keep minor claims from clogging the courts."), Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 
50-51; 378N.Y.S.2d 1,8-9; 340 N.E.2d 444 (1975), (stating that one purpose of no-fault law 
was to ease the strain placed on the state judicial system by tort litigation), Creswell v. 
Medical W. Community Health Plan, 419 Mass 327, 644 N.E.2d 970 (1995) (stating the 
intent of no-fault scheme was, in part, to reduce the number of small motor vehicle tort cases 
being entered in the courts), Dairy land Ins. Co. v. Starkey, 535 N.W.2d 363 (Minn 1995) 
(citing Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. 1983) for the proposition that a 
purpose of the no-fault law was to ease the burden of litigation on the courts). 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a), states in relevant part: 
A person who has . . . direct benefit coverage 
under a policy which includes personal injury 
protection may not maintain a cause of action for 
general damages arising out of personal injuries 
alleged to have been caused by an automobile 
accident, except where the person has sustained 
one or more of the following: 
(v) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
U.C.A.§ 31 A-22-309(l)(a) (emphasis added). As set forth, a plaintiff "may not maintain" 
a cause of action for general damages unless he has sustained medical expenses in excess of 
$3,000. This requirement complements and works in connection with the $3,000 minimum 
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personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage of U.C.A.§ 31 A-22-307(l)(a). As explained by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie9 606 P.2d 1197, (Utah 1980), 
Until the threshold requirements are met, the injured party is 
limited to his direct benefit coverage. If his injuries meet the 
threshold requirements, then he may maintain a claim for 
general damages. 
Id. at 1200. Thus, according to the statutory scheme, a PIP insurer must approve and pay the 
$3,000 in coverage before the insured is procedurally allowed to maintain a cause of action 
for general damages. 
The no-fault statutory scheme also provides an avenue for resolving any 
dispute after suit is filed, as to whether the plaintiff has legitimately met threshold: 
In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or 
on the motion of either party may designate an 
impartial medical panel of not more than three 
licensed physicians to examine the claimant and 
testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the 
claimanfs medical services or expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(2)(e) (emphasis added). Note, this pre-trial process is 
consistent with the words "may not maintain" contained in § 31 A-22-309(l)(a). A plaintiff 
can only be precluded from maintaining a claim for general damages by removing the claim 
from civil litigation. Conversely, to submit the threshold question to a jury does not prevent 
a plaintiff from maintaining a claim for general damages. Jury resolution of a threshold issue 
renders the above-quoted statutory provisions meaningless and defeats the statutes' 
ostensible purpose of keeping minor cases from clogging up the courts' dockets. 
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In the case at bar, plaintiff exceeded threshold before ever filing suit. This was 
acknowledged by State Farm Insurance Company, defendant's own liability carrier, through 
its evaluation and payment of more than $3,500 of plaintiff s medical bills. Defendant never 
made any motion, as provided for in § 31A-22-307(2)(e), to dispute plaintiffs having met 
threshold or to prevent plaintiff from maintaining a cause of action for general damages. 
Plaintiff did maintain a cause of action for general damages, and was entitled to do so 
without "threshold" being unexpectedly inserted as the main issue in the case and without 
unexpectedly being saddled with a new burden of proof at trial. 
Nowhere have Utah appellate courts been asked to interpret U.C.A .§ 31A-22-
309(1 )(a) to create a new burden of proof for plaintiffs in car accident cases. While CT v. 
Johnson, 1999 UT 35,977 P.2d 479 (Utah 1999), discusses award of general damages where 
$3,000 in medical expenses were not awarded, it is clear from a reading of the case that no 
challenge was exerted on appeal to the trial court's decision to submit a "threshold" 
interrogatory to the jury. The validity of that practice was not before the court and has never 
been addressed by Utah appellate courts. 
Unlike Johnson, in the case subjudice, plaintiff does challenge the validity of 
submitting a $3,000 medical expense threshold interrogatory to the jury, on the basis of Utah 
Code Ann.§§ 31A-22-306 through 309. Had the Utah Supreme Court been faced with the 
issue of submitting a "threshold" interrogatory to the jury, it certainly would have struck that 
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practice down, under its own adopted rales of statutory construction. In Johnson, the court 
stated: 
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look 
first to the plain language of the statute." Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 
"We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and 
give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning." Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 
1995) (citation omitted). Furthermore, "courts are not to infer 
substantive terms into the text that are not already there. 
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, 
and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to 
an intention not expressed. "Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 
P.2d, 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). 
Id at Tf 31. (Emphasis added). 
The plain language of U.C. A. §§ 31 A-22-309(l)(a) and 31 A-22-307(2)(e) does 
not create a new burden of proof for plaintiffs at trial, nor does it provide for the jury to 
determine at the end of a trial whether plaintiffs have the right to maintain their claim for 
general damages through trial. The plain language creates a pre-adjudicative screening 
process to determine if one can maintain a claim for general damages. Under the applicable 
standard of review, the court of appeals should properly and definitively interpret the 
statutory provisions according to their plain language and within the meaning of the no-fault 
statutory scheme. Accordingly, the court of appeals should reverse the lower court rulings 
and enter judgment for plaintiff. 
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POINT II 
PLAINTIFF PREVAILED ON ALL REQUIRED ELEMENTS AT 
TRIAL AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED DAMAGES. 
Over several months of litigation, plaintiff prepared to meet his burden of proof 
at trial. Two days before trial, February 2, 2004, the court entered an order, pursuant to the 
parties stipulation (R. 83-84), finding defendant negligent and that defendant's negligence 
had proximately caused the collision. R. 83-84. The court also ordered that the only issues 
for the jury were causation of plaintiff s injuries and the amount of plaintiff s damages: 
The issues presented to the jury for decision will 
be limited to proximate causation of Plaintiffs 
injuries and to the amount of Plaintiffs 
damages. 
R. 83-84. (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff came to trial prepared to prove the remainder of his case. However, 
on the first day of trial, the court informed the parties of its intention to require a jury finding 
that plaintiff had met, by a preponderance of the evidence, the $3,000 no-fault medical-
expense threshold outlined in U.C.A. § 31A-22-309, before the jury could award damages. 
That dramatically and unfairly changed the nature of the case and trial. While plaintiff did 
finish proving his case and prevailed on the legal elements, the jury did not award damages 
because of the prohibitive instruction of the court on the threshold issue. 
Taking advantage of the court's decision to include threshold in the trial, the 
defense largely ignored issues of negligence, causation, and damages and, instead, focused 
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its attack on challenging the relatedness and amount of certain medical bills, all in an effort 
to cause the jury to question bills in excess of $3,000. Defendant was thus allowed to 
undermine plaintiff s whole case by simply attacking a few of the bills. The significance and 
meaning of the trial was thereby transformed from the amount of proper compensation for 
plaintiff, to precluding plaintiff from any recovery based on a technicality that should not 
have been before the jury. 
The legal error of allowing defendant to contest threshold and requiring the 
jury to judge the validity of plaintiff s medical expenses before awarding general damages, 
was compounded when the court precluded plaintiff from adducing evidence of the 
evaluative process performed by defendant's liability carrier, the true party in interest, 
wherein it acknowledged the relatedness of more than $3,500 of plaintiff s medical bills to 
the accident. Defendant was thus allowed to hypocritically make threshold the major issue 
in the case. 
POINT III 
INTERPRETING U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) TO CREATE A NEW 
BURDEN OF PROOF DEFEATS ITS OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE AND IS 
AN ENORMOUS WASTE OF JUDICIAL AND LITIGANT 
RESOURCES. 
As stated above, the ostensible purpose of U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) is to 
lessen the burden on trial courts and conserve judicial resources by providing resolution of 
less-severe cases outside the court system. This purpose is defeated and enormous judicial 
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as well as litigant resources are wasted by going through a full-fledged trial, as happened in 
the case at bar, just to get an answer from the jury that a plaintiffs case did not meet 
threshold and never should have been tried at all. 
The issue of judicial resources and court dockets in regard to non-threshold 
automobile cases should be of concern to the Utah appellate judiciary. During hearing of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, the court revealed that it 
always submits a threshold question to the jury on automobile cases and apparently will 
continue to do so until an appellate court instructs otherwise: 
And I-I guess the truth is, Mr. Raty, you may be 
right, but no one's going to decide until it goes to 
an appellate court. I mean this is every case I try, 
I make the same decision every case. If it's 
different, I wish they'd tell me, and they will, they 
won't hesitate. 
R. 268 (5:19-23). (Emphasis added). 
Judicial and litigant resources need not and should not be wasted. A full-
fledged trial is unnecessary to determine if a plaintiff should be allowed to maintain an award 
for general damages in court. As discussed above and outlined in U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306 
through 309, a much more economical system has already been established for directing 
cases to the proper resolution venue. It is as follows: The no-fault insurer performs an 
evaluation of medical bills submitted by the victim of an automobile accident to determine 
if the treatment is related and the bills reasonable. If the insurer does not believe they are, 
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it does not pay them. Often, the no-fault insurer hires a medical doctor to assist in this 
evaluation. . 
Once the no-fault insurer establishes satisfaction of threshold through approval 
and payment of $3,000 in medical bills, the plaintiff may file his case for general damages. 
Thereafter, defendant may make a motion with the court contesting the relatedness and/or 
amount of the medical bills. If defendant fails so to move, plaintiff is allowed to maintain 
his claim for general and other damages at trial. Yet, it is contrary to law, a perversion of the 
statutory scheme's plain language, and grossly unfair to allow defendant to raise a threshold 
issue at trial for the jury's decision, after plaintiff has already maintained a claim for general 
damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse the lower court's denial of Plaintiff s Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and remand with the order to enter judgment on 
behalf of the plaintiff, along with an order for a new trial, solely on the amount of plaintiff s 
damages. The jury found, and the court entered findings, that defendant was negligent and 
that defendant's negligence proximately caused injury to plaintiff. The prerequisites were 
thus met for an award of damages to plaintiff. It was legal error for the court to create an 
additional burden of proof for plaintiff by prohibiting an award of damages until the jury 
found, by a preponderance of evidence, that plaintiff had incurred in excess of $3,000 in 
accident-related medical bills. Interpreting U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) to create a burden 
-17-
of proof at trial is contrary to its plain language and that of the no-fault statutory scheme, and 
defeats their purpose of screening less severe cases from civil trial Such a construction also 
results in enormous waste of judicial and litigant resources. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 17th day of February, 2005. 
^r*^i 1 * ^ \ \ ¥ 
Matthew H. Raty, Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
Addendum 1: R. 83-84, Order on Defendant's Liability 
Addendum 2: R. 167-169, Special Verdict Form 
Addendum 3: R. 268, Hearing on Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
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Mark C. McLachlan (#2207)
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First National Bank Bldg. 
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Facsimile (801) 521-0177 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD VAUGHN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 
DARIN ANDERSON, ] 
Defendant. ' 
1 ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
1 LIABILITY 
) Civil No. 010908321 
1 Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The parties have stipulated to Defendant's liability in the above-referenced matter, 
specifically, that Defendant was negligent and that Defendant's negligence proximately caused the 
collision in the above-referenced matter. Based upon the stipulation of the parties: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The court shall enter a finding and the jury shall be instructed that Defendant 
was negligent and that Defendant's negligence proximately caused the collision. 
2. The issues presented to the jury for decision will be limited to proximate 
causation of Plaintiff s injuries and to the amount of Plaintiff s damages. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of Ja»«afy, 2004. 
ROSE 
Honorable Judge 
Approved as to form: 
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Third Judicial District 
FEB 0 8 200<f /' I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY,!/ * 
' Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 






SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 010908321 
Judge Robert Hilder 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If 
you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "yes." If you 
find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, 
answer "no." Also, any damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
1. The parties agree that Darin Anderson was negligent. Considering all of the 
evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the negligence of the defendant, Darin Anderson, was the proximate cause 
ka/4409 496 1 . 
of any of the plaintiff Gerald Vaughn's injuries? 
Yes X - No 
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "No", do not answer the remaining questions. 
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "Yes," please continue. 
2. From a preponderance of the evidence, did the plaintiff, Gerald Vaughn, 
sustain a permanent disability, a permanent impairment, or a permanent 
disfigurement, as a proximate result of the accident? 
Yes No X \ 
3. From a preponderance of the evidence, has the Plaintiff Gerald Vaughn 
sustained $3,000 or more in medical expenses as a proximate result of the 
accident? 
Yes No X 
If your answers to Questions No. 2 and 3 are both "No", do not answer Question 
Number 4. If either or both answers to Questions No. 2 and 3 is "Yes", answer Question 
No. 4. 
ka/4409 496 -2-
4. State from a preponderance of the evidence the amount of general 
and special damages sustained by Plaintiff Gerald Vaughn as a result 
of the accident: 
Special Damages 
Past Medicals $ 
Future Medicals $ 
General Damages $ 
TOTAL DAMAGES $ 




























Case No. 010908/T521 
MOTION 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 








BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of May, 
2004, commencing at the hour of 8:03 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
ROBERT HILDER, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court 
for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
By-
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 3 200% 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
MATTHEW H* RATY 
Attorney at Law 
Raty & Kramer 
480 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KRISTIN A- VAN ORMAN 
Attorney at Law 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266 0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 
ORIGINAL 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Mr. Raty, it's your motion and I've read 
it carefully. I have to be very frank with you. I certainly 
have sympathy for your client and feel like you tried a very 
fine case; but everything in there we argued about at trial, 
nothing's changed for me. Tell me why it has. I mean, I just 
don't understand what's new except that you filed a motion. 
MR. RATY: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
As you know, your Honor, we—we tried this case in 
February— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. RATY: —the first week of February of this 
year. And at the close of the defendant's evidence, the 
plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on all issues except 
the amount of damages in the case. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. RATY: And you denied that motion and the jury 
returned a verdict finding defendant had proximately caused 
injury to the plaintiff, but did not award any damages, as it 
had been prohibited from doing that based on a finding that 
plaintiff had not met the $3,000 threshold in medical 
expenses. 
Now, looking at the statute, the—the Utah 
Legislature created a—a scheme here. In Utah Code Annotated 
2 
1 31-8-22—-or dash-22-dash 306 through 309. And that statutory 
2 scheme, as you read through it, was obviously implemented to 
3 keep out of court, keep out of your busy docket, certain types 
4 of cases. Those cases— 
5 THE COURT: I'm not sure they were thinking too much 
6 about my docket, in all candor; but they did want some 
7 incentive to provide the coverages for financial 
8 responsibility in the State. I think that was at the core. I 
9 mean, it has the effect, certainly, of limiting the number of 
10 cases that come to court. 
11 MR. RATY: Sure. And—and I would submit that was 
12 the purpose of the statute. You read the language and I think 
I 
13 that is clear. 
14 Now, the language, 309 says that a plaintiff may not 
15 maintain—may not maintain a—a claim for general damages in 
16 court unless he's met a threshold. And one of the—one of the 
17 criteria is $3,000 in medical expenses. Well, who makes that 
18 determination? According to the statute, not the court, not 
19 the jury. 
20 THE COURT: Now, how does the statute say not the 
21 court? 
22 I MR. RATY: Well, you read rule—or you read Section 
23 | 307—let me give you the exact cite there. 307-2-(e) and that 
24 I sets forth the procedure to be followed by the court if 
25 I threshold is contested. Now I will read that to you, your 
Honor, it says— 
THE COURT: Let me get it in front of me. I— 
MR. RATY: Sure. 
THE COURT: — I know it, but let's be reading it 
together. 
Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. RATY: Thank you. 
In disputed cases, a court, on its own motion or on 
the motion of either party, may designate an impartial medical 
panel of not more than three licensed physicians, to examine 
the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value 
of the claimant's medical services or expenses. 
Now, no motion was made by defendant. Plaintiff 
certainly didn't make a motion, because he knew he had met 
threshold, he—he had exceeded the $3,000 limit as 
acknowledged by defendant's own liability carrier, State Farm. 
And I submitted those letters to you. 
State Farm wrote him and said, you—you've now 
exceeded $3,000 in medical bills; in fact, in one of the 
letters, they talk about meeting threshold and that he's got 
to exceed more than $3,000. So, we met it, defendant did not 
make any motion to the Court disputing that threshold had been 
made. 
We were allowed under the statute to maintain a 
claim for general damages here in your Court, and we should 
4 
have been allowed to maintain that— 
THE COURT: But I think they're different things. I 
think what you point out in the statute is about determining 
entitlement under the (inaudible) statute. What I deal with 
is a threshold requirement before the jury can award general 
damages. And once it comes before me in that context, I do 
not believe the legislature intended to substitute for the 
jury that's empaneled, to create such a cumbersome system. I 
mean, if that—if the—if the legislature was trying to give 
the court some relief, that's not the way to do it. 
I think it then becomes simply a factual question 
that you must meet as a threshold to get the general damages, 
it's factual, it's for the jury, and it's necessarily so and 
it's also important at that stage that the jury be permitted 
to exercise its judgment and not be bound by a decision made 
by a carrier who stands in a different relationship to the 
plaintiff than the party contesting the matter in this court. 
I mean, I know that's in there. I just think it's 
there for a different purpose. And I—I guess the truth is, 
Mr. Raty, you may be right, but no one's going to decide until 
it goes to an appellate court. I mean, this is every case I 
try, I make the same decision every case. If it's different, 
I wish they'd tell me, and they will, they won't hesitate. I 
don't think they've said it, I think there's case law that 
says the opposite. But I think I—I'm not in a position to 
5 
piecemeal say, I'm going to do it differently with you, I may 
as well stick to what I do two to three months and let you 
take it up, which, certainly is not only your right, but if 
you think it's the appropriate approach, I'd encourage you to 
do it. 
MR. RATY: Okay. 
THE COURT: But—but I—you—you've preserved the 
issue, but we're just not seeing it the same way. 
MR* RATY: All right. And I can see—and—and I 
acknowledge, that's been a—a customary practice in the courts 
for many years; but as we know, custom's not— 
THE COURT: No. I know, but the—it's got to be 
changed on the appellate level. I mean, I could be the one to 
change it here and then there might be an appeal from the 
other side. I'm not sure how many minutes it would take Ms. 
Van Orman to file the notice, but it would be pretty quick. 
So, I mean, someone's going to have to take it up. Your 
argument's not without some logic, it's just that I don't 
think it's what was intended. And it is a legal argument. 
MR. RATY: Right. 
THE COURT: I think it's one that could be addressed 
up there. And I'm not sure you'd be doing anyone a favor, in 
a sense, but you sort of will, you'll clarify it. 
And—but your other issues, of course, go to 
experts, which are very much in the sound discretion of the 
6 
1 Court. I mean, I—you're welcome to argue, I'm not here to 
2 cut you off, you've briefed it, I've read it. It's just that 
3 they were carefully considered at the time, and those, I think 
4 in all candor, highly unlikely to be reversed because of the 
5 discretion element. If you're right, you're right on this 
6 point. 
7 MR. RATY: Okay. All right. Well, I appreciate it, 
8 your Honor. I won't— 
9 THE COURT: That sort of cuts out Ms. Van Orman's 
10 argument a little bit. 
11 MS. VAN ORMAN: Although I just would like to 
12 clarify some things— 
13 THE COURT: You can put them on the record, if you 
14 wish. 
15 MS. VAN ORMAN: —just for Mr. Raty's sake. 
16 THE COURT: And you may respond if you want the 
17 benefit of the record, because you may be taking it up and you 
18 may want something— 
19 MR. RATY: Right. 
20 THE COURT: That's fine. 
21 MR. RATY: Okay. 
22 MS. VAN ORMAN: If—if you look at the statute, I 
23 think there's a reason that it's not the customary practice 
24 for everybody to arbitrate these matters before filing suit or 
25 I whatnot. I understand his provision is in 2(e); however, if 
you look at 2, Provision 2 in its entirety, what they're 
talking about is the reasonable value of the medical expenses, 
not what was necessarily incurred in the accident. It's the 
value of the services. 
In other words, if we contested Chiropractor A or— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: —Doctor B saying his charges were 
excessive— 
THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm thinking. It—it-
-it~ 
MS. VAN ORMAN: —in the community— 
THE COURT: —it's a mechanism for the insurers to 
deal with it rather than—yeah. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Right. But we're also not talking 
about—the jury was asked, Was—did Mr. Vaughn sustain $3,000 
as a result of this accident. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: We stipulated, in fact, that the 
charges of the providers were reasonable. And I think Section 
2 talks about the reasonable value of the provider, so if we 
hadn't stipulated to that and if that was an issue where, you 
know, some chiropractor comes in and charges $700 a visit, 
obviously, we're going to say that's not the practice in the 
community. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
8 
MS. VAN ORMAN: And you look at that and they're 
talking about relative value studies, what to look at there, 
THE COURT: Yeah. I know. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Section (b) talks about seventy-
fifth percentile. Then there's the schedules, then the 
commissioner of insurance, then you get to (e) and that's when 
you talk about, all right, if you get to the bottom of it and 
there's still a dispute, take it before a medical panel and 
they'll tell you what's the reasonable amount in this 
community. 
This is not on what is related to the accident. 
This is what is the charges, what are reasonable. 
THE COURT: Your fundamental proximate cause 
argument, which is what the argument of the trial was all 
about. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Exactly. 
THE COURT: What most of them are about. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Exactly. And so I just wanted to 
point that out for the record, that I think the—the entire 
arbitration panel is a last resort on if there's a dispute as 
to the amount of the—the value of the medical services, how 
much the providers charge. And I think we stipulated to that. 
THE COURT: On the other hand, I'm not aware of 
anything that specifically states that—that whether they met 
threshold should be a separate jury question. I just know we 
9 
do it all the time, that makes sense to me, but that may be an 
issue that needs to be addressed, you know. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Well, there— 
THE COURT: And I—I leave it in your hands, both of 
you. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: And there is a standard in Utah that 
says it has to be reasonable and necessary. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: The $3,000 has to be reasonable and 
necessary. Well, reasonable is the amount; but then 
necessary. And I've taken this before the Supreme Court now 
twice in PIP cases, that the charges have to be necessarily 
related to the accident and that's an issue for the jury. 
We've had—I've had a few PIP cases that, oh, 
they've arisen into huge bad faith allegations where 
essentially what it boiled down to is, were those $3,000 
incurred, were they a result of the accident? Not just 
because they were incurred, it's not a strict liability. It's 
essentially, were they related and the judges have all said 
it's—it's an issue for the jury, it's an issue of fact. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: So, that's where we are. 
THE COURT: Arid I'm still there. 
Mr. Raty, do you wish the benefit of the record any 
further? 
10 
MR. RATY: I think it's all in my brief, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It is. It's well-briefed. 
Ms. Van Orman# will you prepare an order denying the 
MS. VAN ORMAN: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I may or may not read about it. 
Thank you. 
MR. RATY: Thank you, your Honor. 
MS. VAN ORMAN: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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